grants to states and imposes conditions on those funds. Congress may pre-empt state regulation but, until it does, states may regulate with standards that differ from federal requirements. The Court got around to articulating a doctrine of restraint: it would no longer analyze whether a statute fell within the Commerce Clause, but only whether Congress had a "rational basis" to think that the statute fell within the Commerce Clause. 27 Commerce
Clause jurisprudence entered its modern era when in 1937 in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corpn, 28 the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act's regulation of unfair labor practices. In departing from the direct/indirect distinction the Court held that intrastate activities that "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions"
were within Congress's power. 29 The effects test "must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them . In Garcia, the Court announced that the protection of federalism depends largely on the political process operating within Congress. Judicial fidelity to federalism norms switch cyclically through political eras of American history in accordance with the electoral change in Congress. 84 It is therefore clear that the debate on limits of Congress's power to legislate under Commerce Clause remains primarily political.
In contrast to the USA, there is a lack of adequate representation in the European Union since the Commission is unelected, Parliament has a power of consultation and at most a possible veto, and the Council is only indirectly accountable through national governments and can impose solutions in areas of majority voting on dissenting states. Therefore, the additional judicial protection seems to be legitimate. However, the assertive role of the CJEU in scrutinizing the internal market legislation could be explained by the roots of the inception of the European Union and dependency on the political will of Member States.
The matter is crucial to the speed of European integration, therefore, political institutions are constructed in such a way that nationalizing forces are to be politically, rather than judicially restrained. As it is believed that the idea of limited national power is simply not judicially enforceable.
In Europe, we could not really imagine that the legislation adopted under Article 114 TFEU as legal basis, deals with criminal matters. The main reason behind that, are differently tailored European treaties compared to the American constitution. European
Treaties are based on sector-specific rules whereas the American Constitution was amended only twenty seven times throughout its long history. There were good reasons to focus on the economy in the beginning of European integration, since a political union was not achievable through a single big step. But we are way beyond the times of the European Coal and Steel Community. The EU is more than a free trade area, it is also more than an economic or monetary union -today the EU takes 85 Their model shows that centralization more often succeeds at delivering the 'right' decision in terms of policy as compared to decentralized systems due to the possibility of pooling expertise at the central level, ceteris paribus. However, the consequences of an erroneous decision at the centralized level can be global, rather than locally confined. Centralization continues to deliver more accurate results in case of less available expertise but decentralization lowers the risk that comes with an erroneous decision.
Irresolvable dilemma
86 See F. Scharpf in R. Howse and K. Nicolaïdis 2001, p. 356-7. political system, Europe should be an economic, political and social unity. The EU's primary purpose is thus not to complete, defend or govern the Single Market. Its main purpose has to be to serve its citizens. The Single Market is not an end in itself, it is an instrument to foster economic growth and produce wealth for the people. 89 European economic integration creates conditions of regulatory and tax competition among member states which reduces the capacity of national governments to respond effectively to the demands and expectations of their citizens. Therefore, the scope of internal market legislation should also relate to contemporary ideals, individual rights or good government. That would give real meaning to the idea, expressed in Article 3 TFEU, that the Union should work to establish a "social market" economy, a term which underlines the link between economic and social policy to ensure greater coherence between the two.
90
I believe that an internal market which is competitive on the global scale cannot be solely based on economic effectiveness. Economic Order in the European Union should be based not only on economic integration, but also consumer safety, social rights, labour policy and environment. The economic focus has often dominated the European integration, especially until the 1990s. Already in the 1997 Action Plan, the European Commission set forth the strategic target to deliver a single market for the benefits of all citizens. In the introduction, it was expressly stated that 'the single market was not simply an economic structure', but included basic standards of health and safety, equal opportunities, and labour law measures. 91 Structuring the internal market is nevertheless an ongoing process which must constantly adapt to new economic and political configurations. Certainly, legislature should keep pace with societal changes. Failure to do so may well lead EU citizens to blame the EU for the failure of the European social model.
92
The comparative study between USA and EU confirms that both systems face similar federal dilemmas. The process of defining limits for legislative competence is a very complex and dynamic problem. The judicial threshold reviews applied in jurisprudence concerning the area of market clearly illustrate that the question on whether or not the social policy should be included in the scope of the Commerce Clause/ internal market keeps 
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returning. This observation proves that the federal questions of this nature are impossible to resolve in an uncontroversial manner, but they are cyclical. Depending on the political climate, sooner or later the issue on what kind of internal market we want in Europe, will return. Therefore, the active judicial intervention should not become a norm but rather be exceptional since matters at stake are tightly linked to the assessment of how much centralization European citizens want in Europe. The revolutionary moment for Europe would be if the European citizens actually acknowledge the internal market to be an issue concerning them directly every day. In turn, the European law would then have to adapt to reality and, thus the inclusion of a social policy.
